Title: [de: Verteidigung Europas]
Author: Hans-Ulrich Rudel
[INDEX LINK]
“Der Weg” Issue: Year 07, Issue 02 (February 1953)
Page(s): 106-107
[LINK]
Defense of Europe
by Hans Ulrich Rudel
No matter how one views the inevitability and intensity of the looming world catastrophe, and regardless of one’s stance toward it, one thing remains certain for us Germans: We are determined to act in a manner that offers us the greatest chance of survival as a people. A Germany without Germans is utterly worthless to us.
It would be scant consolation if our final battalion belonged to an allied nation that, endowed with greater reserves of oil and steel, managed after a prolonged struggle to claim a victory through sheer exhaustion. We have no wish to summon a second Korean War—perhaps on an even vaster scale—for it would mean the self-destruction of our people or the willing, belated fulfillment of the notorious Morgenthau Plan! There looms a peril that one day we might be drafted into designated units, compelled to fire upon our brothers in the East, who, in turn, are marshaled and shaped by Bolshevism into forms that leave them no choice but to shoot back at us.
Let us not underestimate the sway of Bolshevism over our youth in the East! Within a few years, this generation will stand before us as utter strangers—and the ultimate breach will become unavoidable. Thus, the reunification of Germany stands above all else for us. And we must not tarry too long, for otherwise, one day, Russia will indeed stake its claim for us at the Elbe.
We, veterans of the Russian campaign, have always championed a free Europe. This is borne out by the countless comrades from nearly every European nation who, even then, grasped the grand historical mission and battled beside us, shoulder to shoulder. I affirm—as do so many of my comrades—the defense of a free Europe.
Yet the defense of this continent must also be the defense of a Germany free in every respect. This is a cornerstone for expecting commitment and steadfastness from future German soldiers. We will not lend ourselves as a mercenary force that, perhaps in a drawn-out resistance, merely shields the interests of others.
Believing we could serve any other purpose is made exceedingly difficult for us. We set aside all preconceptions, fully conscious that we live and act solely for the future. But how are we treated—we who have proven our readiness to sacrifice against Bolshevism not with mere words, but with deeds?
Our comrades still languish in prisons. I would consider myself dishonorable were I to don a uniform again before the last of them walks free among us once more. This is the demand of the code of comradeship, which we have not lost and will never forsake. For it was this very comradeship that made possible the great achievements of the past war.
They may strip us of everything, persecute us, imprison us—yet comradeship will rise above all! So long as the shadow of the “war criminal gallows” hangs over every future German soldier, so long as he must march with a noose around his neck and a lawyer by his side, aware that many of his jailed comrades did no more than their duty, true soldiers will not be won—only “fellow travelers” at best.
Likewise, no capable force can be forged if it is not irrevocably bound by an oath. A mere “employment relationship” will not suffice. Whoever thinks otherwise knows neither the enemy’s ruthlessness nor the hard-earned experience we gained in the East. Or should we craft an instrument doomed from the start to offer no resistance?
If my corporal behind the machine gun can now say to me:
“Lieutenant, your order to hold this position strikes me as absurd and irreconcilable with my conscience”
… if he thus gains the right to desert and flee, then it’s better not to begin at all. The stakes are too high; it concerns all our lives. With such methods, the game is lost before it starts. And the cause we aim to serve is then left unserved.
Moreover, I hold that a force is better built upon leadership that has already proven its resolve and did not collude with the enemy when the war’s outlook darkened.
The trust of a future army can scarcely be won by anyone who has ever aided the enemy in any way. I assert this because none of us can shake the thought that one who has betrayed once might betray again. Who can assure us that this time we won’t suddenly be sold out to Moscow, even after being summoned to fight the East? Such “direct dealings” have, alas, become all too frequent of late!
Betrayal must remain betrayal, and a deserter is a deserter. Yet whoever seeks to glorify betrayal undermines the resilience of our people and of Europe, handing both over to the enemy’s grasp!
I am convinced that, given the arguments laid out regarding the dangers of a one-sided treaty, we can only conclude that our peoples must avoid entanglement in a martial resolution to the conflict. Rather, a peaceful solution is essential. We must therefore strive for an approach that allows us to follow our own path—one keeping relations and economic prospects open in all directions. Only thus can the unification of Germany be realized, which must remain our foremost aim.
Yet when talk turns to hostile intentions and the need to organize our defense, let us not underestimate the foe who fought us with astonishing tenacity. He is politically schooled and fanaticized.
I believe the new army we seek to establish here must be morally robust: It must know what is at stake; one does not fight merely to ward off blows—one fights for a purpose! That purpose might be freedom, but the freedom of us all! And that includes the whole of Germany!
For now, we hear only the squabbling of our so-called “partners.” As if it were feasible for us to be far weaker than each of our “allies,” yet stronger than our presumed foe!
Determination on one side can only be met with determination on the other. The unity this demands must first be forged. Otherwise, we take the second step before the first.
Our lives and the future of our peoples are not chips to be wagered in a reckless gamble. To raise an army equal to the East will require measures many of us cannot yet fully grasp. We can perhaps only sense them, having known the stark reality of the East ourselves.
Two things are vital: Our statesmen must earnestly seek to gauge the enemy’s true strength—militarily, ideologically, politically, and economically—so they can truthfully tell their peoples what they may face in earnest. And they must credibly declare what their peoples should fight for. Only then can we too adopt a different stance toward these matters!