Voices of Germany [Y1-I6]
Deutschland-Stimmen
Source Documents: German Scan
Note(s): Italics in the article are original.
Title: Voices of Germany [de: Deutschland-Stimmen]
Author(s): The Editor, Schweizer Monatshefte
Issue: Year 1, Issue 6 (November 1947)
Page(s): 388-391
We take this essay from the April 1947 issue of the Schweizer Monatshefte, Zurich.
The Immortal Mistakes
We have received the following from a German source:
The world is brimming with political problems, their decisive importance for the future as undeniable as their complexity. This is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the seeming intractability of precisely the most critical of these issues was, in times past, a reason for the weariness and resignation that had widely become a hallmark of European intellectual life. From this resignation sprang a disinterest in events beyond one’s own borders, a failure to grasp the intellectual evolution of others—a stance that no one today would dare claim was justified for the peoples of Europe.
Even though certain intellectual currents have long cut across all state politics, transcending borders and nations, it is only in our time that an unmistakable divide has emerged on a global scale, leading states to become synonymous with ideological concepts. These are notions and ideas that states shield and spread with all their economic, political, and military might, just as the dominance of these ideas within and beyond their borders becomes the very foundation of their power. The struggle for the supremacy of "one’s own" worldview has thus become the defining trait of modern imperialism. Yet it also remains the final refuge of a culture under threat.
For this reason, no state engaged in world politics can afford to pass by Germany’s fate with indifference, least of all a European nation. Even if the world’s leading statesmen had not repeatedly stressed at international conferences that the "German question" lies at the heart of any future order, the reality of 70 million people in Europe’s core would have made this truth evident again and again. For the long-term course of events, it matters little that this German complex is currently not an active agent in political shaping but a total object; this is relevant only for assigning responsibility. It does not alter the fact that the ultimate fate of Europe’s most populous nation will be decisive for the continent’s destiny.
Germany’s fate, however, will ultimately hinge on the mindset its people embrace—on which of the worldviews now vying for dominance globally will win the active support of 70 million Central Europeans. One may welcome or lament this reality, but no sober political reflection can ignore the facts of population, geography, and influence—especially not one driven by constructive intent and aware of a collective responsibility that must extend far beyond "your own affairs are at stake."
As legitimate as the interest of other nations may be in understanding the inner, intellectual development of the German people, conveying accurate impressions is fraught with practical challenges. True, most of the new German state constitutions enshrine the right to freedom of expression, even as a fundamental right, in full harmony with the Atlantic Charter. But what channels are available to it, especially toward the outside world?
Well, for some time now, a German can again write letters to acquaintances, from which they might glean his views as far as he dares to commit them to paper and as they align with the stance of the respective censoring occupation authority. This is, of course, a heavily constrained option, quite apart from its minuscule reach.
But a German can also pen an article for one of his "non-partisan" newspapers. He can do so—provided, naturally, that he fundamentally aligns with the editorial line. Otherwise, he’ll prefer not to expose himself politically, which could bring him considerable disadvantages, while the publication of his piece would, from the start, be unlikely. For the editorial staff, meticulously chosen by the respective military government and bound by all moral and legal duties under their license, knows precisely what it owes to this trust. And how disruptive is the withdrawal of the scarce paper ration for "disrespect toward the occupation power or a United Nations state," not to mention other easily provable violations, such as those against "the special regulation concerning the treatment of news about refugees and expellees."
Naturally, with all other printed materials—books, pamphlets—still greater safeguards ensure no misuse of the occupation power’s views. It would exceed the scope of this discussion to delve into details here. Let it only be briefly noted that, due to various factors—not least the authors themselves—their value as a gauge of the broader German populace’s mood is limited.
One of the most potent means of voicing one’s views and shaping those of others is radio broadcasting. This was recognized by the victorious and occupying powers not only during the war but acted upon decisively after the fighting ceased. Thus, in place of the "Greater German Radio," "military government stations" sprang up everywhere, their impartiality and political reliability sufficiently defined by that very fact.
Only a word remains to be said about German film. Here, thanks to fortunately straightforward conditions, we can indeed limit ourselves to one word: caution! Caution, that is, for those who view a film in Germany and take it as an expression of German intellectual attitudes or fashion in 1947. It is surely a portrayal of cultural flourishing in Soviet Russia in 1956 or the tastes and trends of Hollywood in 1936. As preferable as these might be to today’s German reality, honesty demands we clarify they are not our own. This is to prevent yet another false impression of Germany from joining the many already afloat.
But not only technically, also morally, the German people today lack a voice. It is needless to restate the reasons here. As understandable as this rejection may be from other nations’ human perspective, its political wisdom is far from proven. On the contrary, it’s easy to see that rejection and silence do not ease the path out of Europe’s most dire historical plight, and that without dialogue, any hope of understanding fades. Yet understanding, in the fullest sense, is the sole and final hope amid today’s clash of worldviews—especially for those peoples whose relentless history painfully proves their inseparable bond in our time, after they failed to embrace this natural truth willingly in better days.
Anyone today calling for the education of Germans toward democracy can count on the agreement of all governments and peoples worldwide. Indeed, all states dealing with Germany, especially the occupying powers, swiftly began implementing this oft-decided education. Yet it soon became clear that the methods of this democratic education varied as widely as the political outlooks behind them. In the end, it was evident that on either side of the "Iron Curtain" slicing through Germany, these were nothing less than the two main fronts of our era’s ideological battles; that only similar "democratic" terms masked concepts fundamentally distinct and irreconcilable. Thus, Germany, like all of Europe, was split in two, one half again shaded by three different hues across its regions. It changes nothing that international conferences readily assert—with no less universal approval—that Europe and the world must not fracture into halves, just as they endorse Germany’s democratic education.
These far-from-uniform forces have been bearing down on Germany for over a year, each claiming to embody the only true form of democracy. But how has the German people’s mindset evolved under them? What traits has this nation’s mentality taken on after National Socialism’s collapse? These can only be discerned and rightly judged in their true meaning for the present and future by recalling and scrutinizing the economic, cultural, political, and broadly human factors that have shaped and continue to shape the German people. Only a meticulous examination of these factors can reveal where the lever must be applied to avert developments that, as negative or even menacing for the future, need correction—at their causes, not their effects. This is a necessity for which opportunities abound in the myriad details of occupation policy as much as in the forthcoming peace treaty for Germany as a whole.
It is a universal human trait that the relatively small worries and woes afflicting the individual often sway his mood and opinions more than fundamentally weighty events whose effects he doesn’t immediately feel. And for Germans, such personal burdens and hardships have reached a magnitude that surely marks the limit of the bearable. Especially in these winter months, an exhausted, malnourished people was forced to endure the cold waves sweeping Europe in overcrowded dwellings with wholly inadequate heating—or often none at all. Add to this an average of three weekdays without electricity, meaning no light and, for many, no way to cook their meals. Factor in the lack of clothing, catastrophic especially with footwear—wet feet with no chance to change shoes—and a picture emerges that is undeniably oppressive to anyone.
What lies beneath these hints, what inevitable effects on health, morale, and mindset they entail, can only be grasped by those who know firsthand what "nutrition" at 1200 to 1500 calories means over time. That is, as Britain’s Minister for Germany, John Hynd, recently put it, "not acute famine, but slow starvation in many cases." ("Starved" was also the official cause cited for several deaths reported by Gelsenkirchen’s magistrate.) Add the statistically proven fact that in one city, housing density stands at 2.8 persons per room—practically 3 to 4 people per space, with a damp cellar ranked the same as an unheatable nook in a rain-soaked ruin. Despite this immense physical and psychological strain, this unspeakably grueling fight for mere survival, it would be wrong to assume the average German has lost the will or capacity to judge broader issues. On the contrary, economic and political thinking has likely never been so widespread, born from each individual’s personal plight. "There are no consumer goods because the factories stand idle. The factories are idle because there’s no power. There’s no power because no coal is mined. Mining falters due to the miners’ hunger. The miners lack food because Germany’s eastern farmlands are cut off." Such reflections and chains of thought are not just the talk of experts or "responsible authorities" today but echo in a thousand variations in every train car, every shop queue, for every conceivable item sparks discussion—because it’s missing. Even the direst situation, the harshest deprivation, becomes infinitely more bearable if hope glimmers that it will one day end. But what does the economic future hold for the German? He reads and hears of sweeping curbs on what industry remains, learns of incalculable reparation demands, and must fear that the German lands east of the Oder and Neisse are lost forever. This would cram far more than 70 million people into a mere 350,000 square kilometers, an area that, even under ideal production, can feed only 40 million. How are the other 30 million to be sustained? Through imports, of course. But with what will they be paid? Through industrial exports—and here the math simply collapses. For industry is to be halved, too, with its once-vital sectors—steel, machinery, vehicles, shipyards—slashed to fractions. Who can imagine a nation of 70 million importing and paying for food for 30 million—at 1936’s cheap peacetime prices, some 4 billion marks—plus all industrial raw materials and banned manufactured goods, without an industry far larger than pre-war Germany’s? This would demand exports that would pose a downright terrifying rivalry to any other industrial state, for such a Germany, bereft of its eastern farmlands, would face a literal matter of life or death.
Truly, these German prospects vanish into shadow, and it feels like mockery when former French Prime Minister Léon Blum, in England, insisted on even harsher curbs on German industry while signaling France’s support for Poland’s claims to annex Pomerania, Silesia, East Prussia, and other German lands. Naturally, such thoughts weigh more heavily on the German mood than daily reports of factory dismantlings, which, per the papers, have hit 85% of the stock in the Eastern Zone and even include the second tracks of all multi-track rail lines.
One of our time’s most telling phenomena is the claims of nearly all Germany’s neighbors on its territories. Telling above all because they lay bare the boundless confusion of concepts, the inner discord of Europe’s mindset, and many other dark traits.
For decades, the right of peoples to self-determination has been proclaimed; in the Atlantic Charter and countless other instances, land-grabbing has been "outlawed," decried as uncivilized, undemocratic, inhumane. And what happens in reality? Thirteen million people have already been driven from lands their ancestors tilled for centuries because Poland and Czechoslovakia coveted them. In summer 1946, France doubled the Saar territory and now severed it from Germany with a customs border. Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg—all have staked claims on German soil.
But what is the German to make of the justifications offered! Poland had to cede land to Russia in the east; it demands German land in the west as compensation. What a muddle of ideas! Either Russians truly live in the ceded area (as is almost wholly the case!), and the cession was just, leaving no claim to recompense. Or Poles live there, and the cession should never have happened—nor been permitted by the "United Nations." Nothing, though, can justify expelling millions of Germans and annexing purely German regions, least of all citing Hitler’s war. For if one says Poland simply needs Silesia’s industry, France the Saar’s coal, or Russia Königsberg’s ice-free port, one adopts the very logic with which Hitler once provoked the world’s defiance! And it helps erase the norm among peoples—to buy what they need but lack—while the other method stands as criminal among civilized nations.
How convincing, how hopeful it sounds, though, when land seizures are justified by "strategic necessities"! When the Czechs, beyond the vast, once-German-populated swathes of Bohemia, now demand the Sudetes’ northern slopes from old Reich territory for strategic reasons. Or when the Soviet military paper Red Star calls the Oder-Neisse line a "strategically better border" for Poland, at 400 kilometers long versus the old Reich’s 1900. All this in an age of air squadrons and the atomic bomb!
Only by thus picturing the daily life of the German people, by weighing the key economic and political forces pressing on its suffering masses, can one grasp this people’s intellectual stance today in its true light and so rightly judge a moment of future shaping. For it would hardly be surprising if the German, from his current plight—after all that has crumbled ideologically and materially—had turned to political radicalism in numb despair. It would be more than understandable if faith in justice, humanity, and culture had withered.
Yet what do we see? A people that, on the only path open to it for expression—elections—has voted overwhelmingly for Christian Social or Social Democratic parties, thus pledging itself to humanity, peaceful labor, and understanding among nations! Yes—against many fears and some hopes, the collapse of National Socialism has not swung to the opposite extreme of radicalism; rather, Germany today is among Europe’s lands where extremes play the smallest role, with the far right vanished and the far left a mere splinter. The new Bavarian state parliament, free of communist deputies since that party failed to secure the 10% vote threshold mandated by the new constitution in any district, stands as a stark example.
Thus, the German people have shown that even in their desperate straits, they are not a source of revolutionary unrest for Europe; indeed, even in direst need, they can be a force for social and political stability. How much more so under normal conditions! They have thereby clearly voiced their will for a peaceful, united Europe in a peaceful, united world. Doubtless, Germany today harbors perhaps the strongest readiness for this community.
Not as a state’s nationality, but as a human tied to the whole of Europe’s cultural and national fabric, the forward-looking German today rejects all that first threatens to make life impossible for his people but truly thwarts the rise and harmony of the greater whole. Yet for this greater good, he must not feel alone much longer. For it would be bold to hope that fate, should this European chance slip by unused again, would grant another.
It is thus of great importance to realize that Germany’s current intellectual state springs from a willpower exerted by its people against the tide and the natural pull of the most decisive forces. And that it can endure only if the hope behind it is not too often, too long disappointed. That hope is called justice.
When the British military government asks Poland to halt the transport of Germans from Silesia during the coldest days—after 66 arrived frozen to death in unheated freight cars in the British zone—and Poland refuses, such a news report can only point one way. When the International Committee of the Red Cross repeatedly protests to France over the starvation of German POWs, when the Soviet Union, beyond its 3 million German prisoners, forcibly deports skilled workers from its zone, these are but a few among countless acts that must stir even the most honest German democrat and peace-lover to wonder if "might makes right" after all. And it would be more than forgivable if the further thought—that these deported workers and scientists, especially long-range missile experts, come from the arms industry—shattered more than peace hopes. All while this German cannot forget that, at that very moment, Hitler’s labor deployment chief, Sauckel, was hanged at Nuremberg for deporting workers.
Above all, in gauging today’s German mindset, one must recall that today’s eight-year-olds will be 18 in a decade. For them, all will look different—not least because guilt will not burden this generation. Their outlook, and that of those to follow, will inexorably reflect today’s political deeds and human conduct. That this German youth, and all nations’ youth, find well-laid foundations to build a secure, livable home for all is the avowed will of the German people today. May that will be seen and valued!
Only one thing is needed: the recognition that those political errors, whose seeming immortality we watch with horror today, are one with unending suffering. Not just for Germany.